Campaign Move 24

1600 to 2000 14 August 1813

Marshal Suchet called a meeting of his three corps commanders to decide how to proceed with the campaign.

7th corps had now received their fourth brigade and are at full strength.    General Munsier recommends continue to attack

16th corps are starting to arrive at Cambrils.   They have suffered heavy casualties and will require some days rest and reinforcement to become operational   General Severoli recommends a retreat to Reus or even Tarragona.   He reports that 4th Spanish corps are in hot pursuit, but have battle casualties

17th corps are one brigade short.   General Halbert recommends continue to attack   He reports that he has lost contact with 1st Spanish corps


Suchet is aware that if he moves west to engage 2^nd Spanish and 5^th British corps he will have to leave Cambrils undefended and at the mercy of 4^th Spanish corps.

He is confident that he can defeat two allied corps and probably hold Cambrils against 2^nd and 4^th Spanish corps plus 5^th British corps.  But if 1^st Spanish corps moves north from Tortosa he is likely to face destruction and the loss of northeast Spain to the allies.

Just before 2000 a report is received from 7^th cavalry brigade to confirm that 1^st Spanish corps has entered Tortosa and is moving north towards Cambrils.

Suchet orders an immediate retreat towards Reus.   16^th corps will lead, followed by 7^th corps.   17^th corps will form the rearguard

Campaign Move 23

1200 to 1600 14 August 1813

Marshal Suchet met with General Severoli as the Italian corps approached Cambrils.   It was all too apparent that the Italians would require two or three days rest and reinforcement before they could become operational again.

Worse still, Severoli confirmed that 4^th Spanish corps was close behind in hot pursuit.

Suchet was aware that Cambrils was now in immediate danger.   7^th corps could hold 2^nd Spanish corps at bay, but only until 4^th Spanish corps arrived on the Mora road.

In the circumstances it would be madness to press home his attack on 5^th British corps well to the west of Cambrils.

He ordered 16^th corps to continue their retreat through Cambrils and on to Reus through the night.

7^th corps would hold their position until the Italians were clear of Cambrils.  They would then fall back on the town and hold it until nightfall.

17^th corps would immediately break contact with 5^th British corps and retreat to Cambrils.   They would send one of their cavalry brigades south to determine whether 1^st Spanish corps were moving north from Tortosa.

He would hold Cambrils until nightfall and wait to receive his cavalry reports before deciding whether to abandon Cambrils and retreat to Reus.

Campaign Move 22

0800 to 1200 14 August 1813

When Captain-General Copons agreed with General Murray that 2nd Spanish corps would attack Cambrils with 5^th British corps they both believed that they would be faced with only 7^th French corps.

He had ordered 1^st Spanish corps to pin 17^th French corps at Tortosa, and if the French should move north they were to follow and attack them on the march.

He was not aware that 17^th corps had broke contact with 1^st corps and was already approaching Cambrils on the Tortosa road.

As 5^th British corps approached Cambrils they were confronted by 7^th corps in front of the town, and also by 17^th corps approaching them from the south.   The latter was marching directly towards the British.

2^nd Spanish corps were screened from view by the hills north of the hills north of the Miravat road.   It was last morning before the French brigade holding this high ground spotted them.

Marshal Suchet was now faced with a difficult decision.    16^th Italian corps were approaching Cambrils on the Mora road.  They were in rout from the battle of the previous day, and if they were to be saved 7th corps would have to redeploy to halt 2^nd Spanish corps and hold the road.

17^th corps were well positioned to attack the British.   But to do so they would have to move further west, leaving Cambrils open to attack from the south.   Suchet had no intelligence to indicate what 1^st Spanish corps were doing.   They might well be marching towards Cambrils from Tortosa.

If he ordered 17^th corps to attack the British, and they failed, they would be in a very dangerous position.   If 1^st Spanish then arrived at Cambrils at first light on 14 August 1813 it was likely that the entire French army would have to surrender of be destroyed.

Campaign Move 21

1600 to 2000 13 August 1813

Marshal Suchet arrived on the battlefield just after 4pm.   He could see that it was too late to break contact and retreat in good order, but he did order a fighting withdrawal.  He then rode to the nearest shaken infantry brigade in an attempt to rally them.

The newly arrived Spanish reinforcements on which O’Donnell was pinning his hopes was not a regular infantry brigade.  It was, in fact, a guerrilla band recently organised as a militia brigade.  They had no training in skirmish or volley fire, so he ordered them to launch a “do or die” frontal attack.

The Italian infantry brigade had already suffered 20% casualties, but still put up a brave front and held the initial assault.   But they were in no state to hold off fresh troops in hand to hand fighting and soon broke and ran.

The rout quickly spread to the nearby town, which was held by a brigade with 50% casualties.   The nearby rout was sufficient to make they turn and flee.

This remaining Italian infantry brigade had 40% casualties.  Even the presence of Suchet could not prevent them from joining the rout, and taking him with them.

As the gunners limbered and started to withdraw they were overrun by the nearby guerrilla’s and forced to surrender.

The Italian cavalry brigade also had 20% casualties, and refused to charge to save the guns.   Rather than risk their complete destruction Severoli ordered them to withdraw and cover the retreat.

A second serious defeat for Suchet, and an end to his planned counter attack.   As night fell he rode south hoping to find that 17^th corps had arrived to join 7^th corps at Cambrils.

Campaign Move 20

1200 to 1600 13 August 1813

Whilst 8^th corps were surrendering at Flix, 16^th Italian corps were fighting a desperate battle just 15 miles to the west at Mora.

The last thing that Severoli wanted to do was fight a battle.   His battered corps had suffered heavy casualties at Torrente, and had been retreating ever since.   The previous evening his corps started to suffer further casualties due to lack of supplies, and he realised he would have to either stand and fight or see his corps destroyed due to attrition.

O’Donnell was confident of an easy victory and anxious to achieve it before Captain-General Copons could arrive and claim it for himself.   Although one of his infantry brigades was still  on the march from Lerida he ordered the remainder of his corps to attack at first light.

By mid afternoon O’Donnell was aware that it would not be the easy victory he had anticipated.   Despite heavy casualties Severoli put up a stubborn fight.   The Spanish advanced bravely and inflicted further casualties on the Italian infantry.    By mid afternoon half of the Spanish infantry were in rout, and the Italian’s still holding their position in front of Mora.   Fortunately his missing brigade had arrived and was available for a final attempt to break 16^th corps.

Campaign Move 19

0800 to 1200 13 August 1813

8^th French corps continued to retreat, pursued by 2^nd Spanish corps.   The French were unable to stop and rally their broken brigades or attempt to organise a rear guard.

As they approached Flix there were confronted by 3^rd Spanish corps.  They had also suffered heavy battle casualties, but unlike the French had started to regroup and reorganize.   They could field sufficient brigades to block the French.

Without a single operational brigade under his command General Harispe had no option but to surrender his corps to the Spanish CinC who accompanied 2^nd Spanish corps.

Observing the surrender the garrison of Flix also laid down their arms and surrendered the town.   This brought the total of French brigades captured to six, more than one third of Suchet’s total infantry strength.

Immediately after the surrender Captain-General Copons called a face to face conference with General Elio and General Rosche to decide how to handle the prisoners and how best to exploit this magnificent victory.

Campaign Move 18

 

1600 to 2000 12 August 1813

Harispe continued to rout towards Flix, hotly pursued by British and Spanish cavalry.  

One of his infantry brigades were cut off and captured by the Spanish, and his corps artillery by the British.   All of his other brigades are in rout.  

Murray and Elio halt at Miravat to regroup.   Copons has called a meeting to decide what to do next.

In the north Severoli has decided to make a stand at Mora.  His rearguard have fought a skirmish with the advance guard of 4^th Spanish corps.

To the south Halbert has been ordered to hold Tortosa.  Despite this he orders an attack on the bridge over the river Ebro.   Del Parque has deployed his corps to defend this river line, and his artillery are well sited to cover the bridge itself.   The leading French brigade suffers heavy casualties, and the remainder abandon the attack.

7^th corps have finally arrived at Cambrils, but too late to support 8^th corps.   Suchet has met with Munsier to decide how to react to the crushing defeat of Harispe.

Campaign Move 17

1200 to 1600 12 August 1813

Captain-General Copons arrives on the battlefield just after midday.   He joins General Elio and orders 2^nd Spanish corps to advance over the bridge and support the British attack.

It is clear to Harispe that the day is lost, and he must take immediate action to avoid disaster.   He orders his corps to retreat towards Cambrils before the Spanish can cross the river Ebro and join the battle.

To cover this movement he orders his cavalry to advance once more and hold the enemy cavalry at bay.   The British immediately charge and rout the French lancers.   This rout breaks the morale of the nearby infantry, who have already suffered heavy casualties.   The rout spreads.

By mid afternoon the whole of 8^th French corps has broken and is fleeing north towards Flix.  In doing so they have abandoned both their lines of supply to Cambrils and any hope of support from the approaching 7^th French corps.

Campaign Move 16

0800 to 1200 12 August 1813

The appearance of the British just south of the town has not caused Harispe to alter the deployment of 8^th French corps.   He has two infantry brigades facing 2^nd Spanish across the river Ebro.  The remaining two infantry brigades, plus the corps artillery, are deployed to the south of the town facing the British.   His cavalry brigade is on his left flank protecting the Cambrils road

Despite no reply from 2^nd Spanish corps Murray orders his corps to advance and engage Miravat.  

He orders his cavalry to engage the enemy cavalry.   This is a bold opening move.  If the British cavalry lose the melee it could halt the whole attack.   However they break the French lancers, who fall back in disorder.

The two French infantry brigades now form square, to prevent the British cavalry taking the Cambrils road.   Harispe orders a third brigade to move to his left flank to protect his line of retreat to Cambrils.   This leaves just one infantry brigade to prevent the Spanish crossing the river.

Murray orders two of his infantry brigades to support the cavalry, and the remainder to threaten the weak garrison of Miravat.

Throughout this period the Spanish stand and watch the proceedings.   He has suffered heavy casualties in the recent battle, and wants to rest his corps to recover before advancing to tackle the French again.

He is also aware that Copons, the Spanish CinC, is due to arrive shortly, and would prefer to let him take the decision whether to risk an attack or not.

Campaign Move 15

 

 1600 to 2000 11 August 1813

General Murray orders his 5^th British corps to cross the river Ebro just north of Amposta.  

Although 8^th French corps are in nearby Miravat, general Harispe makes no attempt to prevent this advance. 

General Elio is just west of Miravat, holding the approach to Gandesa.   His 2^nd Spanish corps have suffered heavy casualties in the recent battle, and he is not anxious to try his luck again against the French.

Elio and Murray have exchanged much correspondence in an attempt to coordinate an attack on Miravat.   First light will determine how effective there plans are.  

Much depends on the assistance 5^th British corps can give to the Spanish effort.   Murray’s bold move has placed him in a dangerous position should Elio fail to support him.

On the other hand Harispe is also in an exposed position, and a very vulnerable one should the two allied corps coordinate an attack on Miravat.

Campaign Move 14

 1200-1600 11 August 1813

There has been a distinct lull in the campaign as both sides attempt to recover from the recent fighting.

Those corps who lost their battle have had to avoid any contact with the enemy throughout the day. 

Those corps who won, but have suffered casualties, also have to avoid the enemy and remain stationary in order to start to replace those casualties

Only in the north has there been any offensive movement.   4^th Spanish corps, who did not play any active part in the battle of Torrente, had pursued 16^th Italian corps, who lost heavy casualties in the battle.

Campaign Move 13

0800-1200 11 August 1813

The three battles fought yesterday have had a striking effect on all seven corps involved.

In the north 16^th Italian corps has managed to withdraw from Torrente, but have left one of their brigades surrounded at Mora.  

3^rd and 4^th Spanish corps must now decide how best to take advantage of this withdrawal.  

In the centre 8^th French corps has forced 2^nd Spanish corps to abandon their siege of Miravat and rescued 21^st infantry brigade.  

In the south 17^th French corps have reached Tortosa just in time to prevent its capture by 1^st Spanish corps.  The Spanish have retreated west of the river to Amposta.   5^th British corps is approaching Amposta and will soon be available to support the Spanish.

7^th French corps is on the march from Barcelona to join the main French army.  

Campaign Move 12

1600-2100 10 August 1813

  Battle of Torrente at nightfall

16^th Italian corps have fought a hard battle, but must withdraw during the night

They have suffered 7 infantry and 2 cavalry casualties

3^rd Spanish corps have suffered too many casualties to pursue the Italians

They have taken 7 infantry and 1 artillery casualties

4^th Spanish corps have not suffered any casualties

They are ready to pursue the Italians at first light.

This was a convincing Spanish victory

  Battle of Miravat at nightfall

8^th French corps have taken most of the battle to reach the Spanish position

But once there they quickly broke the enemy infantry

They have taken 2 infantry and 1 artillery casualties to do so

Their gunners have routed and abandoned their guns

2^nd Spanish corps had put on a brave face, but failed to deliver the goods

They have suffered 8 infantry casualties and two brigades are in rout

Although shaken their gunners remain with the guns

There is sufficient infantry and cavalry to cover the retreat

This was a convincing French victory

Battle of Tortosa at nightfall

17^th French corps have not had sufficient time to close with the enemy

They have achieved a victory of sorts by driving the Spanish back to the bridge

They have not received any casualties during the battle.

1^st Spanish corps have managed to hold the bridge

By a timely retreat they have avoided a major battle and probable defeat

They have suffered 2 infantry and one cavalry casualty

At nightfall all of their brigades are formed

This was an partial French victory

Campaign Move 11

1200-1600 10 August 1813

  Battle of Torrente at 1600

Severoli has withdrawn his corps to a new position between the farm and the hill.   He must hold this position until nightfall

4^th Spanish corps have occupied Torrente and deployed to the north to attack the Italian right wing.

 

3^rd Spanish corps are moving to attack the farm

  Battle of Miravat at 1600

Elio has deployed his corps across the Miravat road. 

His infantry hold the northern hill

His cavalry hold the southern hill

Harispe will hold the centre and attack on his right

Two infantry brigades have been sent along the northern hill

Infantry and artillery advance in the centre

Lancers hold the left flank

Battle of Tortosa at 1600

1^st Spanish corps had already crossed the river Ebro when they sighted 17^th French corps marching towards Tortosa on the Cambrils road.   Both corps had their cavalry deployed to recce Tortosa.   The French chasseurs charged and routed the Spanish dragoons.

Del Parque deployed his corps between the woods and the hill, and his infantry to form square.

Halbert ordered the garrison of Tortosa to join the main corps, deployed his infantry in column of attack and advanced towards the Spanish.  

Del Parque immediately ordered his corps to withdraw towards the bridge.

Campaign Move 10

0800-1200 10 August 1813

Battle of Torrente at 1200

The battle started with general Severoli (top right) in full retreat to reach the Lerida road before 4^th Spanish corps (top left) could cut him off.

This frantic retreat caught both Spanish commanders by surprise.   3^rd Spanish corps were deployed in a defensive position to prevent the Italians from reaching the town of Flix (off table bottom centre).   4^th Spanish corps (top left) expected to have to fight for Torrente (top centre).

Severoli ordered his corps to concentrate between the farm (top right) and the hill to the north of the Lerida road.   The slow response of the Spanish commanders allowed him to do so without any urgent pursuit.

 

4^th Spanish corps occupied the abandoned Torrente and started to deploy to the north of the town to attack the right of the new Italian position.

3^rd Spanish corps advanced to attack the farm from the south.

Campaign Move 9

                                                          1600-2000 9 August 1813

General Severoli, commander of 16^th Italian corps, has opted for an aggressive approach.

His corps started the campaign at Lerida, and he is responsible for the northern flank of the French deployment along the eastern bank of the river Ebro.

His 5^th infantry brigade provides the garrison for his forward base at Flix.  

3^rd Spanish corps have laid siege to Flix, and have cut their communications with 16^th corps. 

Severoli reacted by ordering his corps to move to Torrente and sent a relief column to raise the siege.

He now finds that he has taken on more than he bargained for.  

3^rd Spanish corps have taken up a strong defensive position just north of Flix, and refuse to give way.

4^th Spanish corps are approaching Torrente, which is not only his forward supply base but also only line of retreat to the main French army.  

Severoli finds himself in a difficult position.

He must decide whether to attempt to save his infantry brigade at Flix, and risk losing Torrente.  Or to retreat to secure Torrente, but abandon his brigade at Flix.

Campaign Move 8

1200-1600 9 August 1813

Captain-General Copons is starting to panic. 

His four Spanish corps have not achieved much since the start of the campaign.

None of the French garrisons have fallen, and the only casualties to date have been Spanish.  

He is also aware that the French have had almost three days to concentrate.  He can not understand why they have not made any attempt to raise the sieges of Miravat or Flix.   He should be relieved at this inactivity, but finds it very disturbing.

He is still waiting for news of the eagerly awaited English landing.   He had expected them to arrive two days earlier, and the lack of contact is causing him to wonder whether they may have abandoned their plan to come to his assistance.

He has moved his headquarters south to Gandesa to be nearer to the coast and better able to meet with the English commander if, and when, he lands.  However in doing so he has lost contact with his two northern corps.

His corps commander daily reports cause him even more concern.  All four demand support as they are facing large bodies of the enemy.   Yet he is aware that when the campaign began there were only two French corps along the river Ebro.   So either his commanders are mistaken, or the enemy have already concentrated.

Campaign Move 7

0800-1200 9 August 1913

The Spanish continue to gather west of the river Ebro.

The siege at Miravat continues, and a second one has been imposed 15 miles north at Flix.

The remainder of the Spanish army has not made any attempt to advance.

Meanwhile the French have not made any attempt to counter the Spanish advance, nor to raise the siege if Miravat, which is entering its fourth move.

This apparent inactivity on both sides is hard to understand.  

The advantage to the French is that once concentrated they will have a strong advantage over any Spanish corps they encounter.  However they run the risk of losing a full brigade should either Miravat or Flix fall to the enemy. 

It is true that the Spanish can not advance west and leave a French held town along their lines of supply.   It is also true, as they have found to their discomfort, that trying to storm a fortified town is a risky business.   However it is difficult to understand why they have not imposed more sieges. 

There are only two French corps in the front line, and they have managed to hold four Spanish corps for six moves, or two full days.

There is still no news of the long awaited arrival of the English army.   Hopefully when it does land it will inspire the Spanish to be more aggressive.

Campaign Move 6

1600-2000 8 August 1813

Both sides are aware that an English army is sailing north from Alicante heading for the north east coast.   Both are also aware that when it lands it will have a large impact on the campaign.   But neither side have any idea where, or when,  it will land.

Marshal Suchet has ordered his corps to concentrate, and is moving his headquarters west from Barcelona to shorten his lines of communication with his corps commanders.   He has two corps deployed along the west bank of the river Ebro, and is moving a third up to support them.   His fourth corps is also moving west, but has to keep garrisons along the coast until the English have landed.

Neither Suchet nor Copons will commit until the English have landed, and their indecision has infected their corps commanders.   The Spanish commanders are aware that they only have a limited time to take advantage of the wide spread French garrisons, but none have taken full advantage of it.

2^nd Spanish corps has continued to enforce its siege of Miravat.  It is now entering the second day, and there is a chance of attrition amongst the garrison.   This in turn will make the odds better if the Spanish commander decides to attempt a second storm.  The pressure is also on 17^th French corps to send a relief column to raise the siege.

Campaign Move 5

1200-1600 8 August 1813

6^th French chasseur brigade have orders to hold Tortosa.   They have occupied, but not garrisoned, the city and are observing the road from Amposta

1^st Spanish dragoon brigade have orders to recce Tortosa and are on engage orders.   As they near the city the chasseurs deploy in line just west of the built up area.

The Spanish brigade commander orders his dragoons to advance, which prompts the chasseurs to do the same.

The dragoons are C class troops, which gives a slight advantage to the French horsemen.   They roll a three with 1D6, giving them a total of four.  This results in a draw.   Both are disordered.  The two brigades withdraw a short distance and remain facing either other.

Both brigades remain west of Tortosa, and both have maintained their skirmish screen

Campaign Rule 11 deals with cavalry v cavalry combat

http://napoleoniccampaignrules.blogspot.com/